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Abstract. The reliability and availability of network services are being 
threatened by the growing number of Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks. 
Effective mechanisms for DoS attack detection are demanded. Therefore, we 
propose a multivariate correlation analysis approach to investigate and extract 
second-order statistics from the observed network traffic records. These second-
order statistics extracted by the proposed analysis approach can provide 
important correlative information hiding among the features. By making use of 
this hidden information, the detection accuracy can be significantly enhanced. 
The effectiveness of the proposed multivariate correlation analysis approach is 
evaluated on the KDD CUP 99 dataset. The evaluation shows encouraging 
results with average 99.96% detection rate and 2.08% false positive rate. 
Comparisons also show that our multivariate correlation analysis based 
detection approach outperforms some other current researches in detecting DoS 
attacks. 
Keywords: Denial-of-Service Attack, Euclidean Distance Map, Multivariate 
Correlations, Anomaly Detection. 
1   Introduction 
Network security has received public concerns with the rapid growth and the 
prevalence of interconnection among computer systems. It is now under spotlight due 
to the emergence of more sophisticated attack techniques and easy-access user-
friendly attack tools which facilitates any person to easily launch network attacks with 
little programming knowledge. According to studies [1] and [2], there have been 
10,000 new viruses or variant of existing viruses recorded in the year of 2004, and 
billions of dollars loss has been caused by Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks over the 
past few years. 
The intention of a DoS attack is to deliberately prevent a victim, such as host, 
router or entire network, from being accessible or being capable of receiving normal 
services from the Internet. The availability of network services is seriously threatened 
by the continuously increasing number of DoS attacks. Thus effective mechanisms for 
DoS attack detection are highly demanded.  
To maintain the reliability and the availability of network services, research 
community and industry sector have put a lot of efforts to the development of 
intrusion detection techniques. As one of the powerful network intrusions, DoS attack 
has been carefully studied in the intrusion detection research over the last decade. 
Generally, network intrusion detection can be grouped into two main categories, 
namely signature-based detection [3] and anomaly-based detection [4]. Benefiting 
from the principal of detection, which monitors and flags any network activity 
presenting significant deviation from their normal profiles as a suspicious, anomaly-
based detection techniques show more advanced in detecting zero-day intrusions [5].  
Therefore, recent works in DoS attack detection mainly focus on anomaly-based 
techniques, and various detection techniques have been proposed. For example, 
clustering [6] [7], neural network [8] [9], pattern recognition [10], support vector 
machine [11], nearest neighbor [12] and statistical detection techniques [13] [14] [15]. 
However, some of these proposed techniques often suffer high false positive rate 
since the dependencies and correlations of the features are intrinsically neglected [16]. 
The other techniques are either invalid to flooding-based DoS attacks [10] or 
incapable of identifying individual attack packets from a group of samples [15].  
To address the aforementioned problems, a Euclidean Distance Map (EDM) based 
multivariate correlation (second-order statistics) analysis approach is proposed in this 
paper to discover the relations among features within the observed data objects. 
Significant changes of these relations indicate occurrences of intrusions. Owing to the 
computational simplify of Euclidean distance and the extracted valuable correlative 
information, application of the multivariate correlation analysis makes the DoS attack 
detection more effective and efficient. It achieves high detection accuracy while 
retaining a low false positive rate. Moreover, benefiting from the principal of anomaly 
detection, our DoS attack detection approach is independent on prior knowledge of 
attack and is capable of detecting both known and unknown DoS attacks. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides current work 
related to our research. Section 3 proposes a novel multivariate correlation analysis 
approach. Section 4 presents a detailed description on the applications of the proposed 
multivariate correlation analysis approach in DoS attack detection. Section 5 shows 
the evaluation results of the proposed approach on KDD CUP 99 dataset and makes 
some analysis. Finally, conclusions and future work are given in Section 6. 
2   Related Work 
Owing to the advantage in detecting unknown attacks, anomaly intrusion detection 
mechanism has captured the major attention from research community. Researchers 
focused on studies of sequential change-point detection based statistical DoS attack 
detection approaches [17] [18] in the early 2000s. The approaches make use of the 
abrupt change occurring in the observed sequential data, such as Management 
Information Base (MIB) variables and statistics between the number of SYN packets 
and the number of FIN or SYN/ACK packets. They have been proven effective in 
detecting any abrupt change in network traffic. However, on one hand, in Thottan and 
Ji’s approach [17] the operator matrix may need to frequently update its feature set to 
cover the emergent attacks, and the approach suffers time granularity problem. On the 
other hand, the approach proposed by Wang et al. [18] only targets on SYN flooding 
attacks, and its performance is affected by the passive RST packets. Moreover, the 
two approaches consider only the first-order statistics and ignore the correlative 
information which is important to detection accuracy.  
Recently, the intrusion detection research community started recognizing the 
importance of the second-order statistics of monitored-network features. Several 
researches have been conducted to explore the use of the second-order statistics in 
DoS attack detection. A team of researchers from the Hong Kong Polytechnic 
University [15] employed the covariance matrices of the sequential samples and 
proposed a threshold based detection approach to detecting various types of DoS 
attacks. Travallaee et al. [19] applied Covariance Matrix Sign (CMS) for DoS attack 
detection. These approaches achieve encouraging detection rates. However, they still 
suffer from comparative high false positive rates and do not work under the situation 
where an attack linearly changes all monitored features. In addition, the approaches 
can only label a group of observed samples as normal or attacks, and cannot identify 
individual attack packets from the crowd.   
Our work also makes use of the idea of change and the second-order statistics. We 
investigate the change of the correlations between features which are the second-order 
statistics of the features in a single observed data object. This makes our approach 
more advanced in detection accuracy and the ability of labeling individual attack 
packets.  
3   Multivariate Correlation Analysis 
The behavior of network traffic is reflected by its statistical properties. DoS attack is a 
type of intrusions attempting to exhaust a victim’s resource, and its traffic behaves 
different from the normal network traffic. Therefore, the statistical properties can be 
used to reveal the difference. To well present the statistical properties, we propose a 
novel multivariate correlation analysis approach which employs Euclidean distance 
for extracting correlative information (named inner correlation) among the features 
within an observed data object. The detail is given in the following. 
Given an arbitrary dataset       
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where   
  is the value of the l
th
 feature in the i
th
 traffic record. l and i are varying from 
1 to m and from 1 to n respectively. 
In order to further explore the inner correlations of the i
th
 traffic record on a multi-
dimensional space, the record   
  is first transformed into a new m-by-m feature 
matrix   
  by simply multiplying an m-by-m identity matrix I as shown in (2). 
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The elements on the diagonal of the matrix   
  of are the features of the record   
 . 
Each column of the matrix   
  is a new m-dimensional feature vector denoted by 
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conditions of             and       . Thus the m-by-m feature 
matrix   
  can be rewritten as (4). 
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Once the transformation is finished, we can apply the Euclidean distance to extract 
the correlation between the feature vectors j and k in the matrix   
 , which can be 
defined as 
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where                       . However in practice, (5) can be 
simplified and rewritten as (6) in order to reduce computational complexity. 
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Therefore, the correlations between features in the traffic record   
  are defined by a 
Euclidean Distance Map (EDM) given below. 
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Since the EDM is a symmetric matrix (in which      
       
 ) and there is a zero 
distance from a feature vector to itself (     
          ), the upper or the lower 
triangle of the matrix is sufficient to reveal the inner correlations. Hence, the EDM 
can be simplified and converted into a new inner correlation vector containing only 
the lower triangle of the EDM as (8). 
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For the dataset  , its inner correlations can be represented by (9). 
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By making use of the inner correlations, the changes of network behavior caused 
by DoS attack can be clearly revealed. Additionally, the distance measure facilitates 
our analysis approach to withstand the issue of linear change of all features. 
4   Multivariate Correlation Analysis Based Detection Approach  
The objective of this paper is to develop a detection approach that is effective in 
detecting any known and unknown DoS attacks. Thus, the concept of anomaly-based 
IDS, which attempts to identify network intrusions by detecting any significant 
deviations from a profile generated using only normal traffic records in training phase, 
is the best fit to our problem.  
4.1   Norm Profile Generation 
In this work, the norm profile is first built through the density estimation of the 
Mahalanobis Distances (MDs) between observed normal traffic records and the 
expectation of the normal traffic record. To obtain the distribution of the MDs, two 
parameters are required to be determined. They are the mean μ and the standard 
deviation σ of the distances.  
Assume that there is a set of g normal training traffic records, which is denoted 
by          
                 
                 
                   
         , the parameters 
can be determined by using the equations shown below. The mean μ is defined as 
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The expectation of the lower triangles of normal EDMs (        
               ) and the 
covariance matrix     ) are given in (12) and (13). 
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The covariance between two arbitrary second-order statistics in the lower triangle of 
normal EDM is as given in (14) 
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where  
     
       
 
 
      
         
   . The standard deviation σ can be obtained by 
using (15). 
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The obtained distribution of the normal training traffic records is stored in the 
norm profile for attack detection. 
4.2   Attack Detection 
According to the definition of normal distribution, roughly 99.7% of the values are 
within 3 standard deviations from the mean. Therefore, the decision can be made by 
comparing the distance of an observed object to the mean of the distribution. If the 
distance is greater than 3 standard deviations from the mean, it is flagged as an attack 
with 99.7% confidence.  
To make the comparison, the EDM of the observed traffic record (        
        ) 
needs to be generated using the proposed multivariate correlation analysis approach. 
Then, the MD between the         
         and the expectation (        
               ) of the 
lower triangles of normal EDMs stored in the normal profile is computed using (16). 
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Then, the values are compared with the pre-defined threshold given in (17).  
                 (17) 
For a normal distribution, n is usually ranged from 1 to 3. This means that we 
would like to make a detection decision with a certain level of confidence varying 
from 68% to 99.7% in associate with the selection of different values of n. Therefore, 
if the observed MD is greater than the threshold, it will be considered as an attack. 
5   Evaluation and Analysis 
This section describes and analyzes the results obtained from the evaluation of the 
performance of the proposed multivariate correlation analysis based approach on DoS 
attack detection. The evaluation is conducted on KDD CUP 99 dataset [20]. 
The 10 percent labelled dataset of KDD CUP 99 dataset is applied for evaluation 
purpose. Although the dataset is not without criticism [21], it is the only public 
dataset with labelled attack samples. Moreover, for the comparison, many research 
works were evaluated using this dataset. There are six different types of DoS attacks 
available from the 10 percent labelled dataset. They are Teardrop, Smurf, Pod, 
Neptune, Land and Back attacks. 
To evaluate an IDS, detection rate and false positive rate are two important metrics. 
We aim to achieve a high detection rate while retaining a low false positive rate. To 
visually reveal the performance of the IDS, Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) 
curve is employed to show the relations between these two metrics. 
5.1   Preprocessing 
We first filter all records with the labels of Normal, Teardrop, Smurf, Pod, Neptune, 
Land and Back from the 10 percent labelled dataset. Then, further classify them into 
different clusters according to their labels. The description of the filtered data is 
presented in Table 1. 
Table 1. Number of records of normal and DoS attack records 
Normal Teardrop Smurf Pod Neptune Land Back 
97,260 9,790 2,807,900 2,640 1,072,010 210 22,030 
5.2   Results and Analysis 
To evaluate the detection performance of the proposed approach, we conduct 10 fold 
cross-validations and 32 continuous features are used. Norm profiles are built with 
respect to different types of traffic, namely TCP, UDP and ICMP traffic. In the 
training phase, we only employ the Normal records, while Normal records and the 
attack records are all involved in the test phase. In the test phase, we vary the 
parameter n given in the (17) from 1 to 3 with an increment of 0.5, in order to 
compare the detection accuracy with the change of the threshold. The results are 
shown in Table 2. 
As can be seen from Table 2, our proposed multivariate correlation analysis based 
detection approach performs very well in most of the cases. The detection rates of 
Normal records rise from 97.92% to 99.13% along with the increase of the threshold. 
The Smurf and Pod attack records are completely detected without being affected by 
the change of the threshold. For Teardrop and Neptune attacks, our approach achieves 
approximately 100% almost in all cases. The detection approach suffers from mirror 
degeneration in the case of Land attack when the threshold set greater than 2σ, but it 
still manages to detect around 74.76% of the attack records. However, when detecting 
Back attacks, the detection accuracy suffers from a sharp decrease from 92.37% to 
45.71% and finally down to 6.42% when the threshold keeps increasing. This problem 
may be caused by the non-normalized data in which some features dominate the 
detection performance during their comparatively large values. 
Table 2. Detection rates for normal and DoS attack records against different thresholds 
 Type of records Threshold 
 
1σ 1.5 σ 2 σ 2.5 σ 3 σ 
Normal  97.92% 98.47% 98.75% 98.99% 99.13% 
Teardrop 100% 100% 100% 99.99% 99.98% 
Smurf 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Pod 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Neptune 100% 100% 100% 99.99% 99.99% 
Land 100% 100% 96.19% 87.62% 74.76% 
Back 92.37% 45.71% 9.93% 9.16% 6.42% 
 
To better understand the performance of our proposed multivariate correlation 
analysis based detection approach, ROC curves are given in Fig. 1. 
 
Fig. 1.  ROC curves for the detection of DoS attacks 
The ROC curves show clear tradeoff between the detection rate and false positive 
rate. There is a common trend that detection rates of all attacks increase when larger 
numbers of false positive are tolerated. If high detection rates are required, we have to 
endure a comparatively high false positive rate of 2.08%. However, 2.08% false 
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positive rate is still in the acceptable range and even better than other detection 
approaches. 
To further evaluate the performance of the proposed approach, a comparison with 
covariance feature space based network intrusion detection [15] and HCVM [22] is 
given in Table 3. 
Table 3. Performance comparison of different detection approaches 
 
Multivariate correlation 
analysis based detection 
approach (Threshold = 
1δ) 
Covariance feature space 
based network intrusion 
detection (Threshold approach 
with 3D principle) [15] 
HCVM[22] 
Detection rate 99.96% 99.95% 93.2% 
False positive rate 2.08% 10.33% 5.4% 
 
In general, our multivariate correlation analysis has been proven by the evaluation 
results and it can correctly extract the statistical properties to exhibit the behaviour of 
network traffic. The application of multivariate correlation analysis in DoS detection 
gives promising outcomes. 
6   Conclusions and Future Work 
This paper has proposed a Euclidean distance based multivariate correlation analysis 
approach to extract the inner correlations (second-order statistics) of network traffic 
records, which can better exhibit the network traffic behaviours. We have evaluated 
the analysis approach using the KDD CUP 99 dataset. The results show that these 
second-order statistics can clearly reveal the changes of network behavior caused by 
DoS attack. The multivariate correlation analysis based DoS attack detection 
approach achieves 99.96% detection rate and 2.08% false positive rate. The detection 
accuracy is improved by involving the second-order statistics instead of the original 
first-order statistics into the classification.  
However, our approach still suffers from a high false negative rate in detecting 
Back attack. This may be caused by the non-normalized data or the redundant features 
in the dataset. Therefore, we will employ data normalization methods and optimal 
feature selection in our future work in order to improve the detection accuracy. Also, 
temporal information will be considered in the successive research. 
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